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COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
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ROBER TA ROMANO *
In this Essay, Professor Romano considers the efficacy of competition among
states for tax revenues generated by corporate charters. To this end, she focuses
on how state takeover regulation-regulation which tends to benefit management
rather than shareholders--affects this competition. She argues that federalism
provides a safety net which protects investor interests and reduces the likelihood of
self-serving management decision. Professor Romano concludes that the current
state-based system of incorporation is preferable to a national regime.
INTRODUCTION
tHIT S Essay concerns competition among states for the business of
L corporate charters, which, in my judgment, is the genius of Ameri-
can corporate law. In the United States, corporate law-which concerns
the relation between a firm's shareholders and managers-is largely a
matter for the states. The legislative approach is, in the main, enabling:
code provisions supply standard terms for corporate governance, and
these terms function as default provisions that firms can tailor more pre-
cisely to their needs through charter amendments. Moreover, firms
choose their state of incorporation, a statutory domicile independent of
physical presence, which can be changed through shareholder-approved
reincorporation. Firms can therefore not only particularize their char-
ters under a state code, but they can also seek to incorporate in the state
whose code best matches their needs-i.e., the state whose code mini-
mizes their cost of doing business.
The central problem animating corporation codes is the separation of
ownership from control in the modern public corporation. Large firms
typically have numerous shareholders with small holdings who cannot
actively exercise control over the firm or monitor management. In addi-
tion, managers running such firms usually have infinitesimal sharehold-
ings. This creates an agency problem because management's operation of
a firm may deviate from the shareholders' wishes in maximizing firm
value. A primary purpose of corporation codes is to create corporate
governance devices that seek to mitigate the agency problem by better
aligning managers' incentives with shareholder interests. Prominent ex-
amples are shareholder-elected boards of directors, shareholder voting on
* Allen Duffy/Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Essay was
presented as the Robert L. Levine lecture at Fordham University School of Law. It is
part of a larger work entitled The Genius of American Corporate Law, which will be
published by the AEI Press in 1993; some passages also appeared in my article, Rethink-
ing Takeover Regulation, published in the Fall 1992 issue of the Journal of Applied Cor-
porate Finance.
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fundamental corporate changes, and fiduciary duties imposing liability
on managers who act negligently or with divided loyalty.
Shareholder-manager relations in public corporations are also subject
to an array of national controls under the federal securities laws. The
federal securities laws regulate the issuance and trading of securities, the
continuing disclosure responsibilities to investors of public firms, and the
ground rules of takeovers-corporate acquisitions that, in contrast to
mergers, are achieved by tender offers to the shareholders, and thus by-
pass incumbent management's approval.' Unlike state corporation laws,
federal regulations are mandatory. The federal securities laws' reach into
traditional spheres of state jurisdiction, such as fiduciary duties, has been
expanded and contracted over time by federal courts. But even here, the
national legislation is not preemptive; it expressly preserves a role for
states in securities regulation.
State jurisdiction over corporate law is a function of federalism. A
federal system of government produces a number of benefits for its citi-
zens. First, a federal system protects individuals from the immense
power of national government as the states are a counterweight to the
national government.2 Second, compared to a centralized governmental
system, a federal system allocates public goods and services more effi-
ciently, and increases individual utility due to its ability to match specific
government policies with diverse citizen preferences regarding such poli-
cies. In a federal system, states and municipalities compete for citizens,
who choose to reside in the jurisdiction offering their preferred package
of public goods and services.' Finally, federalism spurs innovation in
public policy given the incremental experimentation afforded by having a
laboratory of fifty states competing for citizens and firms.4 A policy im-
provement identified by one state is rapidly enacted by other states.5
Just as a federal system's benefits are axiomatic in American politics, it
is also well recognized that federalism can impede the administration of
government and thereby diminish individual welfare. In particular,
where a public policy's costs and benefits do not fall within a jurisdic-
1. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1988); Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-7Thbbb (1988). The states also regulate securities, and, unlike
the federal regime, many states engage in merit regulation under which state officials
must be satisfied about the merits of a security before it can be sold. Firms traded on
national exchanges are, however, typically exempt from state regulation.
2. This insight is not new to the federalism debate. See, e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 1835 (R. Heffner ed., 1956).
3. The classic article presenting this thesis is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
4. Recent discussions of the benefits and costs of federalism include Competition
Among States and Local Governments: Efficiency and Equity in American Federalism
(Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) [hereinafter Competition); Thomas R.
Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments (1990).
5. For a brief summary of numerous studies of the diffusion of legislative and other
public policy measures across the states, see Albert Breton, The Existence and Stability of
Interurisdictional Competition, in Competition, supra note 4, at 38.
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tion's boundaries, the optimal quality and quantity of public goods and
services will not be produced. For example, a state will not want to pay
for a benefit experienced by nonresidents, such as an agricultural spray-
ing program that benefits adjoining jurisdictions, or highways used by
interstate travellers, and hence it will underprovide the good. Similarly,
a state may export to nonresidents the cost of providing goods and serv-
ices to their residents. For example, a state can adopt taxes that are more
likely to be paid by out-of-state, rather than in-state, individuals or firms
(such as natural resource states' severance taxes, Nevada's gaming taxes,
or Iowa's single-factor corporate tax formula).6 Another consequence of
federalism is the potential for interjurisdictional competition that is a
negative-sum game. For example, competing states have been known to
adopt economic development policies under which the subsidies offered
to firms cost more than the local jobs they create.'
The corporate law literature is a microcosm of this tension in the pol-
icy debate over federalism because an important theme in the literature is
the effect of competition among states for tax revenues generated by cor-
porate charters. Corporation codes can be viewed as products whose
producers are states, and whose consumers are corporations. A key
question is whether there is any reason to suppose that code provisions
benefit investors? The concern arises because Delaware, which is a small
state by any measure (population, geography, industrial production, and
agricultural production), has dominated all the rest in granting corporate
charters. Approximately half of the largest industrial firms are incorpo-
rated in Delaware, and more corporations listed on national exchanges
are incorporated in Delaware than in any other state. Moreover, the vast
majority of reincorporating firms move to Delaware. This is a stable and
persistent phenomenon; Delaware has been the leading incorporation
state since the 1920s. As a result, a substantial portion of the state's
revenue-averaging 15.5% from 1960 through 1990--is derived from
incorporation fees.
The dynamic business environment in which firms operate places a
premium on a state's responsiveness to corporations' legislative de-
mands-that is, on a state's ability to adapt its corporation code to
changing business circumstances. It also places a premium on having a
decentralized regime. This is because the trial and error process of in-
terjurisdictional competition enables a more accurate identification of op-
timal corporate arrangements when there is fluidity in business
6. Advisory Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, Inteijurisdictional Tax and
Policy Competition: Good or Bad for the Federal System? 36-37 (Apr. 1991). Iowa's
single-factor corporate tax formula based on sales helps local firms that sell the bulk of
their products out-of-state.
7. See Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid, Introduction, in Competition, supra note
4, at 22-23.
8. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Corporate Law]; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorpora-
tion Puzzle, I J.L. Econ. & Organization 225, 240 (1985).
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conditions. Delaware excels in both of these areas. It has consistently
been the most responsive state; when Delaware is not the pioneer of a
corporate law innovation, it is among the first to imitate.
Delaware's extraordinary success in the corporate charter market, due
to its responsiveness to changing corporate demands, is the source of a
perennial corporate law debate on the efficacy of federalism. This is a
debate over who benefits from the laws produced in a federal system and,
in particular, from Delaware's corporation code-managers (who select
the state of incorporation) or shareholders (who ratify that selection)? If
managers and not shareholders benefit, then, from the objective of corpo-
rate law itself, the current allocation of authority between the state and
national governments would be undesirable.
The best assessment of the evidence is that a federal system is for the
better and that Delaware's code, for the most part, benefits shareholders.
Indeed, with the widespread enactment of state laws regulating take-
overs, the debate's focus in the late 1980s shifted away from Delaware
and towards other states' actions. In this important area of statutory
innovation, an interesting role reversal occurred: Delaware was a lag-
gard rather than a leader.
Until the Supreme Court upheld state takeover regulation in 1987, 9
takeover statutes could be largely ignored when evaluating the efficacy of
state competition because the statutes' constitutionality could be ques-
tioned. 0 The persistent and rapid proliferation of takeover statutes
across the states thereafter presented an apparently thorny question for
advocates of federalism. Many commentators consider these statutes to
be harmful to shareholders because the statutes aim to thwart takeovers
from which shareholders benefit handsomely and top management
loses. 1 The question is how best to understand the enactment of these
statutes? Is there something special about takeover laws, as compared to
other provisions in corporation codes, that suggests that they are legisla-
tive anomalies? If this is the situation, takeover regulation might merit a
jurisdictional exception to come under exclusive national government
control. But if there is no basis for distinguishing between the legislative
process and the impact on investors of takeover statutes and other corpo-
ration laws, then the persistence of these statutes could call into question
the efficacy of the federal system.
This Essay evaluates whether confidence in the efficacy of state compe-
tition should be shaken by the onslaught of state takeover legislation dur-
ing the 1980s. The strongest case for national regulation involves
9. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
10. For example, most federal courts reviewing takeover statutes after Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), found them unconstitutional. See Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 118 (1987); Manning G.
Warren, III, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and It's Aftermath, 40
Bus. Law. 671, 679 n.57 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 220-22 (1991).
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takeover statutes because managers' and shareholders' interests diverge
sharply and jurisdictional spillovers affecting third parties, such as em-
ployees, are thought to be present. If national regulation cannot be justi-
fied in this apparently compelling context, then reform proposals which
find fault with state competition and seek to nationalize corporation
codes12 should be approached with considerable skepticism.
The answer provided in this Essay is that the saga of state takeover
statutes does not remove the burden of persuasion placed on advocates of
national corporate laws by research on the effects of state competition on
shareholders. In fact, the lesson to be drawn is quite the opposite. While
state competition is an imperfect public policy instrument, on balance it
benefits investors. More important, there is little basis for supposing that
national regulation of corporate charters would be a better system, while
there are sound reasons for supposing it would be worse.
I. THE FEDERALISM DEBATE IN CORPORATE LAW
In the 1970s, William Cary and Ralph Winter developed the classic
positions in the modem debate over whether state corporation codes ben-
efit shareholders. Cary contended that Delaware's heavy reliance on in-
corporation fees for revenues leads it to engage in a "race for the bottom"
with other states in which laws are adopted that favor managers over
shareholders. 3 He therefore advocated national legislation establishing
corporate law standards to put an end to state competition. This position
was, for many years, the consensus view of corporate law commenta-
tors, 4 and his agenda continues to attract support.
Winter agreed with Cary's characterization of the powerful force of
competition producing laws that firms demand, but he identified a crucial
flaw in Cary's analysis which, when corrected, suggested that the race
was more for the top than the bottom: Cary had overlooked the many
markets in which firms operate (capital, product, and corporate control
markets) that constrain managers from choosing a legal regime that is
detrimental to shareholders.15 Winter's important point was that firms
operating under a legal regime that did not maximize firm value would
be outperformed by firms operating under a legal regime that did, and
would therefore have lower stock prices. A lower stock price would sub-
ject a firm's managers to the possibility of either employment termination
12. See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1992).
13. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
Yale L.J. 663 (1974).
14. For example, in June 1976, 80 law professors signed a letter endorsing a role for
the national government in corporate law. See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities
Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d sess., at 343 (1977) (letter
submitted by David L. Chambers).
15. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Government and the Corporation (1978); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
Legal Stud. 251 (1977) [hereinafter State Law].
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(because the firm goes out of business due to its higher cost of capital
than competitors with value-maximizing domiciles) or replacement by a
takeover bidder who can increase firm value by reincorporating under a
value-maximizing regime. This threat of job loss provides a powerful
incentive to align managers' and shareholders' interests in the choice of a
legal regime. Winter's critique forced adherents of Cary's position to
amend it. The contention became that markets are imperfect constraints
on managers and, hence, that there is sufficient slack in the system to
enable managers to select states with non-value-maximizing legal
regimes.
Since the publication of the Cary and Winter articles, empirical studies
have sought to arbitrate the debate over who benefits from state corpora-
tion codes by determining the economic impact of managerial discretion
to choose among alternative corporation codes by changing a firm's in-
corporation state. They conclude that the choice benefits rather than
harms shareholders. The conclusion rests on widely-accepted financial
econometric techniques known as event studies, which examine whether
particular information events-discrete public events introducing new in-
formation to financial markets, such as a firm's decision to
reincorporate-produce a significant effect on a firm's stock prices. 6 If
an information event is considered beneficial to shareholders (that is, if
investors believe that it enhances the value of their equity investment),
then stock prices will significantly increase upon the public announce-
ment of the event. If an event is perceived as detrimental to shareholder
wealth, then stock prices will significantly decline. Such stock price ef-
fects are typically referred to as abnormal returns. The posited relation-
ships between changes in stock price and reincorporation announcements
restate the Winter and Cary theses in testable event study form. The
implication of Cary's thesis that shareholders are harmed by Delaware's
code is that firms should experience a significant negative price effect
when they announce a reincorporation in Delaware. Similarly, Winter's
hypothesis predicts a significant positive effect.
There have been five event studies of reincorporations. While several
have found significant positive price effects upon reincorporation in Dela-
ware, no study found a negative stock price effect as Cary would have
predicted. 17 The data are therefore most consistent with Winter's hy-
16. The researcher examines whether the average residuals of a regression of observed
stock price on predicted stock price are significantly different from zero.
17. See Allen Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 Del. J. Corp. L.
368 (1979) (positive returns); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the
Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1989) (significant
positive abnormal returns on event date); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market
for Corporate Charters: 'Unhealthy Competition' versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus.
259, 274-75 (1980) (significant positive abnormal returns two years before event); Jeffry
Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experi-
ence, 18 Fin. Mgmt (No. 3) 29, 36 (1989) (positive abnormal returns in short interval
around event significant at 10% level); Romano, supra note 8, at 269-70 (significant posi-
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pothesis of the efficacy of competition.
Some advocates of national corporation laws question the usefulness of
event studies. Melvin Eisenberg and Lucian Bebchuk contend that event
studies do not indicate investors' evaluation of the new state's regime
because of the possibility of confounding signals if a reincorporation an-
nouncement is accompanied by disclosure of a new corporate strategy.1 8
In such a situation, a positive stock price reaction may be the result of
investors' assessment of the new strategy and not the value of the new
statutory domicile. It is, however, improbable that such information
could swamp an otherwise significantly negative stock price effect of a
reincorporation. If this offsetting effect hypothesis is correct and
reincorporation has a wealth-decreasing effect, we should observe a sig-
nificant negative stock price effect for firms changing domicile to engage
in activities that are perceived to favor managers over shareholders. In
contrast, there should be no offsetting effect for those reincorporating in
order to undertake activities deemed beneficial to shareholders. The
stock price effect is not, however, significantly different across firms rein-
corporating for different business purposes-that is, for those planning to
undertake activities that commentators consider adverse to shareholder
interests (fortifying takeover defensive tactics) and those which they do
not criticize (implementing a mergers and acquisitions program or reduc-
ing taxes).19 Shareholders also must approve a reincorporation, and the
SEC requires detailed disclosure of differences in legal regimes in proxy
materials. It is not credible to contend that informed shareholders will
approve a destination state whose regime is adverse to their interests.
Moreover, if management threatened not to undertake a newly proposed
value-maximizing strategy for the firm if shareholders were to vote
against reincorporation in a state with a non-value-maximizing regime,
such conduct would be a breach of fiduciary duty."
Bebchuk further questions whether event studies can ever resolve the
state competition debate. He asserts that even if the findings of positive
or insignificant stock price effects upon reincorporation are bolstered by
further studies finding even stronger positive stock price effects, this will
not arbitrate the Cary-Winter debate because there could always be some
code provision that disadvantages shareholders but whose negative im-
pact is netted out by greater positive price effects of other code provi-
sions.21 However, it should be noted that Bebchuk's contention, while
tive abnormal returns on and in short interval around event, for portfolio of all reincorpo-
rating firms, as well as firms reincorporating for acquisition purposes).
18. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L Rev.
1461, 1509 (1989); Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1448-49. At the time of a reincorporation,
firms often disclose information concerning corporate policy changes, undertaking the
move to reduce the cost of implementing the new strategy. See Romano, supra note 8, at
253-54.
19. See Romano, supra note 8, at 272.
20. See Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 278 (Del. Ch. 1986).
21. See Bebehuk, supra note 12, at 1449-50.
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cast as a criticism of the empirical basis for supporting a federal system
of state corporation laws, acknowledges that state competition is on the
whole beneficial for shareholders because the effect of good provisions
outweighs the bad.22 Far from shifting the burden of proof from advo-
cates of national regulation to advocates of state competition, this argu-
ment implies that state competition generally benefits shareholders.
Thus, those who would promote Cary's position have the burden of dem-
onstrating empirically which particular code provisions harm sharehold-
ers and why national legislation would be more likely to alleviate the
problem.
II. TAKEOVER STATUTES: CORPORATE LAW
ANOMALY OR PARADIGM?
In the context of takeover laws, the benefits of state competition ap-
pear to be problematic. In contrast to most corporation code contexts,
the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders in the take-
over setting is stark. In a takeover, management is placed in an endgame
situation. By supporting a bid that provides a hefty premium, and
thereby benefitting shareholders, management subjects itself to a risk of
loss of employment upon the bid's success. While target shareholders
experience abnormal returns in takeovers ranging between twenty and
forty percent, 23 managers are frequently replaced. Studies find a higher
than average turnover in management after a takeover, particularly after
a contested takeover.24 Indeed, the larger management's wealth change
from a takeover (i.e., the larger its stock and option holdings) and, thus,
22. Indeed, Bebchuk's theoretical analysis of those state code provisions that have
undetected marginal negative impact, and thus require national legislation, identifies fidu-
ciary duty provisions. See id. at 1483-84. Yet, there have been several event studies that
have isolated the impact of statutes that limit a director's fiduciary duties for negligence
and the impact of adopting conforming charter amendments or reincorporating in order
to obtain the benefit of such statutes, and the majority find positive or insignificant stock
price effects over the relevant event periods. See, e.g., Bradley & Schipani, supra note 17,
at 65-69; Vahan Janjigian & Paul J. Bolster, The Elimination of Director Liability and
Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Investigation, 13 J. Fin. Res. 53 (1990); Netter &
Poulsen, supra note 17, at 37-39; Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the After-
math of the Insurance Crisis, 39 Emory L.J. 1155 (1990) [hereinafter Corporate Govern-
ance]. Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani emphasize that Delaware firms experienced
significant negative returns on the limited liability statute's effective date, which was 12
days after its enactment. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 17, at 56-57. This finding is
irrelevant to an assessment of the statute's impact because no new information was re-
leased on this later date. These studies are discussed in greater detail in Corporate Law,
supra note 8.
23. For reviews of studies on returns to target shareholders, see Michael C. Jensen &
Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control. The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 5 (1983); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persps. 49 (Winter 1988). It should be noted that the
weight of the evidence indicates that these takeover gains are efficiency-related and are
not wealth transfers from other participants in the firm. See Roberta Romano, A Guide
to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 Yale J. on Reg. 119, 120-21 (1992).
24. For a review of studies on management turnover, see Eugene Furtado & Vijay
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the more closely aligned management's interests in the bid are with those
of the shareholders, the less likely management will resist a takeover.'
In addition to the agency problem, jurisdictional spillovers in the form
of negative externalities-i.e., effects on third parties outside the man-
ager-shareholder relation (such as workers)-are thought to be present in
the takeover context. As noted earlier, this is a conventional argument
against federalism and for resorting to national regulation. Takeover
statutes thus provide the strongest case in theory for national preemption
of the states. Moreover, they are the one area of state legislation where
empirical studies provide support for Cary's characterization of state
codes, although not for the laws of Delaware: researchers have found
significantly negative stock price effects upon enactment of takeover stat-
utes in several states other than Delaware. 6 Accordingly, the case for
national regulation stands or falls in this most compelling context.
A. A Brief History of Takeover Regulation
Takeover regulation in the United States is an area of dual jurisdiction.
The ground rules for tender offers are set forth in the Williams Act, na-
tional legislation which was enacted in 1968.27 From management's per-
spective, the primary benefit of the Williams Act is that it facilitates
delay. For example, the Act provides opportunities for litigation alleging
material misstatements or omissions in disclosure documents. If target
management is successful in a preliminary hearing, it obtains an injunc-
tion which halts a bid's progress temporarily until a trial on the merits,
or until a flawed disclosure is corrected. This is often akin to defeating a
bid because delay either permits competing bidders to come forward, al-
lowing management time to locate a more preferred partner, or provides
management with the opportunity to restructure defensively in order to
avoid acquisition altogether.
To the extent that competition increases the bid price, shareholders
can benefit from delay. This benefit may be more apparent than real,
however, because by increasing initial bidders' costs, delay is likely to
reduce the probability of a bid in the first place, which lowers share-
Karan, Causes, Consequences, and Shareholder Wealth Effects of Management Turnover
A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 19 Fin. Mgmt. (No. 2) 60 (1990).
25. See Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, Agency Theory Managerial Welfare,
and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 Rand J. Econ. 54 (1984).
26. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
27. The Williams Act (Act of July 29, 1968), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78ff). The Williams Act
was further amended in 1970. Its main components are: (1) substantive regulation of
terms and procedures for bids, such as requirements of withdrawal rights, pro rata ac-
ceptance of shares if a bid is over-subscribed, and regulation of extensions and changes in
bids, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (adding § 14(d)); (2) prebid disclosure (of ownership and inten-
tion) upon acquisition of a five percent block, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m (adding § 13(d)); and
(3) antifraud protection for communications concerning the offer by the bidder or incum-
bent management, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (adding § 14(e)).
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holder welfare.2" Moreover, in over twenty percent of takeover contests
in which management employed litigation as a defensive maneuver, the
target remained independent upon defeating the bid, and shareholders
did not receive a premium.29
At approximately the same time as the enactment of the Williams Act,
Virginia adopted the first state takeover statute. Thereafter, many states
intervened in takeovers, with the pace of legislation accelerating in the
mid-1970s as the number of takeovers increased.30 Finding the Williams
Act to be inadequate as a defense to takeovers, states sought to fashion
rules that were more favorable to incumbent managements. Under the
first generation of state laws, tender offerors had to submit plans to a
state agency and obtain approval before proceeding with bids. This regu-
lation was far more advantageous to management than obtaining a pre-
liminary injunction against a bidder for violation of the Williams Act,
because state review tended to be extremely protracted.
Bidders quickly attacked state takeover statutes using two constitu-
tional arguments related to the supremacy of the national government
over the states: (1) burdening interstate commerce, and (2) preemption
by the Williams Act. The issue was preliminarily resolved in 1982,
when, in Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court found that first gener-
ation takeover regulation burdened interstate commerce.3 A plurality
considered the statutes preempted as well.32
MITE did not, however, deter states from attempting to intervene in
bids. They quickly fashioned new regulations, known as second genera-
tion statutes, which exhibited greater diversity in approach than first gen-
eration statutes. The most prominent of such laws are: (1) "control
share acquisition" statutes, which restrict the voting rights of bidders'
shares without the other shareholders' approval; (2) "business combina-
28. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981); Alan
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 229 (1986).
The effect of takeover actions on shareholder welfare has been roundly debated. For a
review of the debate, see Romano, supra note 23, at 122-55.
29. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests
Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J.L. & Econ. 151 (1985).
30. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public
Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457, 458-60 (1988).
31. 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982). Ralph Winter distinguished first generation takeover
statutes from state competition over corporate codes by stressing that first generation
takeover statutes have extraterritorial effect-i.e., they apply to firms with plants located
in the legislating state, and not solely to domestically-incorporated corporations. Winter
maintained that this jurisdictional provision enabled states to restrain the competition for
charters and, thus, to enact shareholder wealth-decreasing laws. See State Law, supra
note 15, at 268, 287-89. Subsequent generation takeover statutes do not have such broad
jurisdictional hooks; consequently, they do pose analytical problems for state competition
advocates. In fact, in a recent comment, Winter noted the possibility that some states
(particularly those regulating takeovers) may not seek to maximize franchise tax revenues
and, hence, the "race to the top [may be a] walk." Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for the
Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1526, 1528-29 (1989).
32. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 639.
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tion freeze" statutes, which limit bidders' ability to engage in business
combinations and other related transactions with targets after a bid's suc-
cess; and (3) "fair price" statutes, which require bidders to pay at least as
much for shares in the second stage of a two-tier acquisition as they paid
in the first stage.
Unlike first generation statutes, second generation statutes regulate a
corporation's internal affairs (i.e., matters of corporate governance),
which are the province of the incorporation state. These statutes often
codify defensive tactics that firms can, and did, undertake voluntarily by
charter amendment. Such an approach was considered a constitutionally
acceptable means of avoiding MITE's strictures. Regulating matters of
internal affairs is a valid exercise of state power, despite an impact on
commerce, because it does not meet the MITE Court's tests of unconsti-
tutionality. Because these statutes' jurisdiction depends on the incorpo-
ration state and not on presence of assets (which was the jurisdictional
basis of first generation statutes), second generation statutes do not have
an unconstitutional extraterritorial effect: a firm cannot be subject to in-
consistent regulations as only one state has jurisdiction. In addition, the
new statutes do not discriminate against out-of-state shareholders be-
cause they affect shares of all bidders, regardless of domicile. Indeed, the
MITE court emphasized in its Commerce Clause analysis that Illinois
had "no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corpora-
tions."33 Further, by phrasing the statutes so that they involve internal
affairs, states ensure that the question of preemption is not revived; such
matters are conventionally thought to be in a state's exclusive sphere of
authority, and the Williams Act is not regarded as having altered the
historical regulatory balance between Congress and the states.
In 1987, following a series of lower court decisions invalidating control
share acquisition statutes, the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. ofAmerica, upheld Indiana's version of the statute.' This decision
made clear that the states have a role in takeover regulation and, with
this decision, takeover legislation proliferated. Most states continued to
innovate, enacting multiple takeover statutes that provided firms with a
menu of defensive protections. The most popular recent form of regula-
tion is the "other constituency" statute, which permits or requires corpo-
rate boards to consider the interests of nonshareholder groups in their
decisions, and which has been adopted in over half of the states; the most
draconian is Pennsylvania's "disgorgement" statute, which prohibits
failed bidders from earning a profit on the sale of their shares. The surge
of takeover regulation slowed, however, by the early 1990s, as the acqui-
sitions market came to a standstill.
33. Id. at 645-46.
34. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 86-87 (1987).
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B. The Politics of Takeover Statutes
The politics of takeover statutes are consistent with the view that man-
agement reactions to takeovers evidence an agency problem. Top man-
agement, the clear loser from hostile takeovers, is the principal promoter
of takeover legislation, rather than the shareholders who benefit from the
transactions. Takeover laws are typically sponsored by a local chamber
of commerce at the behest of a major domestic corporation that is the
target of a hostile bid.35 They are often rapidly enacted, sometimes over
a few days in special emergency sessions (depending on the urgency of
the situation of the firm seeking the legislation). Moreover, the statutes
are usually enacted without public hearings. Legislative support is bipar-
tisan and near unanimous.
Takeover statutes are not, as some might suspect, promoted by a broad
coalition of business, labor, and community leaders who fear that a
change in control will have a detrimental effect on the local economy.
While union representatives endorse takeover legislation in some states,
in the vast majority, the other organized group besides management that
promotes the legislation is the corporate bar. Anecdotal accounts sug-
gest that the roles of these two groups are reversed when contrasted to
the usual legislative process of corporate law reform: business lobbying
organizations lead the way in takeover statutes whereas the bar is the
prime mover behind most corporation code changes.36
The absence of broad-based lobbying for takeover statutes does not
mean that legislators voting for such statutes are not motivated by a con-
cern for saving local jobs. But if workers', and not managers', jobs are
the primary motivation of legislators, such a perception is not well-
founded. Numerous studies have sought to measure the effects of take-
overs on employment and wages.37 They fail to find a detrimental impact
on labor: takeovers generally do not affect the employment of produc-
tion workers, nor do they reduce union wages.3 B In the small set of cases
where labor suffers losses as a result of a takeover (primarily reductions
in administrative staff employment), the loss is a very small proportion of
the bid premium (i.e., ten to twenty percent).39
35. For a listing of firms and states, see Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-
Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. (No. 3) 365
(1988); Romano, supra note 30, at 461 n.l1.
36. See Romano, supra note 10, at 122-36.
37. See, e-g., infra notes 38-39. For a non-technical review of this extensive literature,
see Romano, supra note 23.
38. See, e.g., Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effect of Ownership
Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central Office and Other Personnel, 33 J. Law
& Econ. 383 (1990) (analyzing the effects of corporate takeovers on production and ad-
ministrative personnel); Joshua G. Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Take-
over Premiums?, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 263 (1990) (examining the impact of corporate
takeovers on long-term and short-term union wages).
39. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate
Specialization, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1990, at I
(Martin N. Baily & C. Winston eds., 1990).
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Moreover, a close examination of the political process of takeover leg-
islation raises serious questions of whether employee welfare is a concern
in the first place. Business groups-the moving force behind takeover
statutes-vigorously oppose plant-closing legislation; takeover statutes
regulating severance pay and union contract security are careful to ex-
empt friendly acquisitions; and other constituency statutes do not require
boards to consider worker interests, nor do they provide workers with
the right to enforce the statute against a board that did not act in their
favor. If employee, rather than top management, job security, was the
true object of concern, we would not observe such carefully crafted
distinctions.
Like most forms of pork barrel legislation, takeover statutes are almost
always unanimously approved. The likely explanation for such legisla-
tive unanimity is that the benefits and beneficiaries (real or supposed) of
such legislation are highly concentrated-many, if not most, of the target
company's managers and workers reside within the state-while the
costs are borne largely by a group of loosely organized, geographically
dispersed shareholders. When viewed in this light, unanimity in the en-
actment of takeover statutes appears to be a function of a previously
noted disadvantage of federalism: the benefits and burdens of a law may
not be contained within the legislating jurisdiction. When such spillover
effects occur, interjurisdictional subsidization and exploitation can occur
as citizens of the legislating state benefit from a law while citizens of
other states bear the cost. This is the theoretical underpinning of the
case for national regulation. 4'
C. Delaware's Unique Position on Takeover Regulation
A striking anomaly in state takeover regulation is that Delaware has
been much slower to respond than other states in this corporate law re-
form context alone. Delaware did not enact a first generation statute
until 1975, seven years and six states after Virginia's initial legislation,
and it did not adopt a second generation statute until after the Supreme
Court's CTS decision. With regard to most major corporate law reforms,
however, Delaware was the first or second state to act.4 ' Moreover, both
of Delaware's takeover statutes were less restrictive of hostile bids than
those of other states. For instance, its first generation statute did not
have a hearing requirement and, unlike other states, had an opt-out pro-
vision.42 Its second generation statute bans business combinations for
only three years (compared to New York's five years) and can be avoided
entirely if the acquirer obtains eighty-five percent of the stock in the
transaction in which it becomes interested.43
40. See Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 Va. L
Rev. 563 (1983).
41. See Romano, supra note 8, at 240; Corporate Governance, supra note 22, at 1160.
42. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1982).
43. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
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Several important features related to interstate externalities distinguish
Delaware from other states and in large part explain the difference in
Delaware's takeover statutes as compared to those of other states. They
also help explain why enactment of takeover regulation in Delaware was
protracted despite its demonstrated ability to move quickly on matters of
corporate law reform. First, Delaware has a more diverse corporate con-
stituency (including both target companies and bidders) than other
states. In fact, there is a significant negative correlation between a state's
having been at the forefront in enacting a second generation statute
before the CTS decision, which is an indicia of an aggressive anti-take-
over regulatory stance, and the number of hostile bidders incorporated in
a state.' Second, the very large number of firms incorporated in
Delaware, few of which are physically present in the state, means that no
one firm's management has the clout to get a bill enacted. This also
makes it cheaper for shareholder groups and institutional investors to
lobby the Delaware legislature, as the cost is spread over a large number
of portfolio holdings. Finally, although it is not a formal requirement, all
corporate law legislation in Delaware is initiated, reviewed, and formally
approved by the bar prior to introduction in the legislature. The diverse
interests represented by the Delaware bar at the earliest stages of legisla-
tion make it more difficult to enact statutes with unintended conse-
quences and mitigate the harmful effects on shareholders of takeover
laws that are enacted. This is because the Delaware bar represents a far
broader set of constituent interests than the corporate bar in other states;
bidders, as well as targets, have local Delaware counsel. 45
D. Wealth Effects of Takeover Regulation
Empirical research on the wealth effects of takeover laws is, as previ-
ously noted, most consistent with Cary's view of the harmful effect of
state competition. Event studies find either statistically significant nega-
tive stock price effects or no effect.46 Jonathan Karpoff and Paul
44. See Romano, supra note 10, at 142-45.
45. In other states, the local corporate bar tends to be aligned with incumbent man-
agement because when firms merge, the acquirer's counsel will typically be counsel to the
combined entity.
46. The following studies found significant negative stock price effects from takeover
statutes: Adam Broner, Office of Economic Policy, New Jersey Shareholders Protection
Act: An Economic Evaluation (1987); Donald G. Margotta, Stock Price Effects of
Pennsylvania Act 36 (Feb. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, PA Law: State Antitakeover Laws
and Stock Prices, 46 Fin. Analysts J., Jul.-Aug. 1990, at 8; Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul
H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J.
Fin. Econ. 291 (1989) [hereinafter Wealth Effects]; Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry Netter,
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. Econ. & Organization
373 (1988); Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986
Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects, 6 J.L. Econ. & Organization 253
(1990); Laurence Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The
Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes, 19 Rand J. Econ. 557 (1988); J. Gregory
Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, Corporate Takeovers, the Commerce Clause, and the F--
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Malatesta, in the most comprehensive event study of takeover statutes,
examined the stock price effects of forty second generation statutes which
were enacted through 1987 and were covered in the press. They find a
small, statistically significant decrease in stock price (-.3%) on the two-
day interval of the earliest press reports of proposed legislation.47 They
find no significant stock price effect on important dates in the statutes'
legislative histories (i.e., dates of bill introduction, floor votes, and guber-
natorial signing) that were not simultaneously covered in the press. Fur-
ther, there is no significant effect over longer intervals around press
report dates. When the sample used in the study is broken down by type
of takeover statute, the abnormal returns have a negative sign for control
share acquisition, fair price, and business combination freeze provisions,
but only the negative returns for business combination freeze provisions
are statistically significant.4" Finally, when the data are examined over
time, only statutes enacted in 1986 or later had a significant negative
price effect.49
It is important to note that event studies of Delaware's second genera-
tion statute find no significant stock price effect 50 This datum is consis-
tent with the view that Delaware's efforts at regulating takeovers are less
cient Anonymity of Shareholders, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1092 (1990); Samuel H. Szewczyk &
George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Controk The Case of
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1992). In contrast, the following stud-
ies did not find any significant stock price effect from takeover statutes: Donald G.
Margotta & Swaminathan Badrinath, Effects of New Jersey Shareholder Protection Leg-
islation on Stock Prices (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review); John S. Jahera & William N. Pugh, State Takeover Legislation: The Case of
Delaware, 7 J.L. Econ. & Organization 410 (1991); Donald G. Margotta et al., An Analy-
sis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation, 6 J.L. Econ. & Organi-
zation 235 (1990); William N. Pugh & John S. Jahera, Jr., State Antitakeover Legislation
and Shareholder Wealth, 13 J. Fin. Res. 221 (Fall 1990); Romano, supra note 10; Roberta
Romano, What Is the Value of Other Constituency Statutes to Shareholders?, U. Toronto
L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1993). Some of the studies in the latter category, such as
Margotta & Badrinath, supra, find significant negative effects for some event time inter-
vals but not for other intervals, and therefore conclude that the laws have no detrimental
wealth effects.
47. Wealth Effects, supra note 46, at 308-09.
48. See id at 312-14. The average abnormal returns across the three types of statutes
do not, however, differ significantly.
49. This is not surprising, as investors could have assumed that statutes enacted prior
to 1986 (the year before CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), was
decided) would be found unconstitutional under Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982). It is unfortunate that Karpoff and Malatesta chose 1986 as the year for dividing
their sample; 1987, the year of the CTS decision, would have allowed for a breakdown
that captured the change in legal uncertainty. The choice was presumably dictated by the
number of observations in the subsamples because the study's data ended in 1987. It
must be noted, however, that despite the constitutional uncertainty, the 1986 Indiana
statute upheld in CTS had a significant negative impact upon its enactment. See Sidak &
Woodward, supra note 46, at 1100. This suggests that the insignificant effect of pre-1986
statutes is not a function of investors expecting their invalidation by courts, but rather, of
their assessment of the statutes' substantive effect on bids.
50. See Jahera & Pugh, supra note 46, at 416-27; Wealth Effects, supra note 46, at
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restrictive than other states. Thus, when focusing on takeover statutes,
one sees a 180-degree role reversal of the Cary scenario of state competi-
tion: Delaware is more a "reluctant follower" than a leader because it
seeks to maintain its dominant market share while other states "race for
the bottom" to entrench management. 51 Whatever the adverse effect of
state competition in regulating takeovers, Delaware is not the source of
the problem.
Quite apart from Delaware's steady legislative policy of sailing against
the wind when it comes to takeover regulation, California, a major cor-
porate domicile, has still not adopted any takeover regulation. 2 Thus,
because not all states regulate takeovers, a firm's relative value will be
affected by remaining in a lesser valued (i.e., more regulated) regime.
Paradoxically, Pennsylvania's disgorgement statute provides a good
example of the beneficent effect of state competition. Event studies of
Pennsylvania firms have identified large significant negative abnormal re-
turns at the time the disgorgement statute was enacted. 53 After unsuc-
cessfully opposing the legislation's adoption, institutional investors
threatened to sell their shares in firms covered by the statute, and a ma-
jority of corporations opted out of the statute.54 As indicated in table 1,
of publicly-traded firms with a Pennsylvania domicile whose choices
were identified, 127 firms opted out of the statute in whole or in part,
while only 72 firms did not opt out.55 The proportion opting out is
higher among the larger firms (firms likely to have a higher proportion of
institutional investors): 43 of 58 exchange-listed firms opted out, com-
pared to 84 of 141 over-the-counter firms. Exchange-listed firms that
opted out, in fact, have a higher proportion of institutional owners than
those that did not opt out of the statute.5 6 These data indicate that when
a corporation's investors express concern about the impact of a particular
statute on their firm, managers will be responsive to their concerns. Re-
searchers have further found that firms that opt out of the statute experi-
ence positive abnormal returns.
51. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics 52-53 (Brookings Discussion Paper in Eco-
nomics No. 91-4, 1991).
52. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 223.
53. See, e.g., Szewczyk & Tsetsekos, supra note 46, at 9-15, 19. For a review of sev-
eral studies of this statute which all report similar results, see M. Wayne Marr, Jr., Survey
of Empirical Studies: Pennsylvania Act 36, 48 Fin. Analyst J. 52 (1992).
54. See Leslie Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Pro-
tection, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1990, at Al. Firms were permitted to opt out of the statute
within 90 days of the effective date, provided their boards approved an amendment to the
corporate by-laws.
55. I would like to thank the many Pennsylvania firms whose counsel provided me
with information about their firm's choice, and Robert Daines, who provided assistance
in compiling this information.
56. See Szewczyk & Tsetsekos, supra note 46, at 18.
57. See id.; Marr, supra note 53, at 3. Significant positive abnormal returns were
experienced by the full sample of firms opting out of all or some of the provisions and the
subsample of firms opting out of all of the provisions, but the abnormal returns for the
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TABLE 1. FIRM CHOICES ON COVERAGE OF PENNSYLVANIA'S 1990
TAKEOVER STATUE
Choice Exchange firms' Other firmsb Total
Opting out of entire statute 18 33 51
Opting out of control share
acquisition, disgorgement
and other constituency
provisions 0 2 2
Opting out of control share
acquisitionc and
disgorgement provisions 21 39 60
Opting out of control share
acquisitionc and other
constituency provisions 0 1 1
Opting out of disgorgment and
other constituency provisons 0 1 1
Opting out of disgorgement
provision only 3 0 3
Opting out of control share
acquisitionc provision only 1 8 9
Not opting out of statute 15 57 72
Unidentified 5 104 109
Total 63 245 308
a Pennsylvania firms listed on New York Stock Exchange or American
Stock Exchange
Pennsylvania firms listed on other exchanges, NASDAQ's NMS system,
or traded over-the-counter
Opting out of control share acquistion provision automatically opts firm
out of labor protection provisions as well
The large-scale withdrawal by Pennsylvania firms from inclusion
under a value-decreasing statute is powerful support for the acuity of
Winter's insight in his critique of Cary. Capital markets discipline man-
agers, notwithstanding their best efforts at entrenchment, by placing a
floor on deleterious state competition. This contention is further sup-
ported by the fact that few other states have followed Pennsylvania's lead
and enacted a disgorgement provision.58
III. SHOULD TAKEOVER REGULATION BE NATIONALIZED?
In state takeover regulation, it is clear that Delaware stands out from
the pack. Still, it is arguable that Delaware would not have enacted any
subset of firms that only partially opted out were insignificant. See Szewczyk &
Tsetsekos, supra note 46, at 17.
58. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, only one other state,
Ohio, has copied Pennsylvania's disgorgement provision. Telephone Interview with In-
vestor Responsibility Research Center (1992) (discussing State Takeover Laws, as up-
dated through summer 1991).
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takeover legislation in the absence of state competition.59 Acknowledg-
ing that the dismal track records of most states in takeover regulation
raise serious questions concerning the efficacy of state competition does
not imply that national regulation of takeovers is the solution to an im-
perfect federal system. This is just the beginning of the inquiry.
The principal analytical problem in advocating national control is that,
while everyone affected by the regulation will now reside in the legislat-
ing jurisdiction, the beneficiaries-corporate managers-are still a con-
centrated group, and those bearing the costs-shareholders-are still
dispersed. Collective action problems involving this asymmetric organi-
zational advantage of managers over shareholders are not avoided at the
national level. Regardless of forum, managers are more easily organized
across firms than shareholders. Business trade organizations, such as
chambers of commerce, provide valuable information to their members,
inducing individual participation in collective activity.6" Shareholder or-
ganizations are at a comparative disadvantage because they provide indi-
viduals with far fewer inducements to action (although, in recent years,
institutional investors have begun to organize and engage in lobbying ac-
tivities in reaction to efforts by state legislatures to expropriate their
wealth). Further, individuals are more likely to coordinate their actions
to avoid losses than to achieve gains because of risk aversion (they care
more about preventing losses than achieving gains of equal magnitude).6'
This factor also favors incumbent managers, who, in contrast to share-
holders, stand to lose from takeovers. Finally, the cost-benefit calculus is
not changed by moving from state to national level: the average top
manager's financial interest in the outcome of a takeover will still be
much higher than the average shareholder's interest and, of course, man-
agement's lobbying expenditures will still be paid by the corporation.
It is possible that, while the national political dynamic still favors
managers, Congress's output might differ from that of the states. The
record to date, however, is that in the takeover area, Congress mimics
the states.62 The impetus for congressional action on takeovers-which,
in the 1980s, consisted primarily of holding hearings and introducing
bills-is the same as that for state action: a hostile bid for a major firm
located in the sponsoring legislator's state.63 In addition, the principal
witnesses at congressional hearings are corporate managers, government
employees, and elected officials; labor groups are rarely witnesses and
shareholder witnesses are rarer still." More important, the vast majority
59. See Roe, supra note 51, at 52.
60. See Romano, supra note 30, at 468-70.
61. See Russell Hardin, Collective Action 82-83, 120-21 (1982); Romano, supra note
30, at 470.
62. See Romano, supra note 30, at 470-81.
63. See id. at 481-84; Kenneth Lehn & James W. Jones, The Legislative Politics of
Hostile Corporate Takeovers 31 (Mar. 19-21, 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Fordham Law Review).
64. See Romano, supra note 30, at 485.
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of the bills introduced in Congress rival or outdo state laws in efforts at
restricting bids.6" It is significant that the bills that have been on
Congress's takeover agenda in recent years have been overwhelmingly
one-sided against bidders because successful law reform is typically a re-
combination of old elements already in the legislative hopper rather than
a completely new proposal.6 6 Of course, the Williams Act itself was not
neutral regulation; it tilted the contest towards incumbent management
and away from bidders.6'
Despite the heightened level of congressional interest, no major sub-
stantive takeover statutes were enacted in the 1980s,68 in large part be-
cause the Reagan and Bush Administrations opposed greater regulation.
Lacking presidential and agency support, Congress had little incentive to
legislate, for it would have faced either a veto fight or an uncooperative
agency that could thwart legislative objectives by unenthusiastic imple-
mentation. In addition, the Supreme Court's CTS decision reduced the
pressure on Congress to act because it enabled target managers to con-
centrate their appeals for relief on state legislatures, which had already
shown themselves to be very cooperative. Indeed, state legislatures were
capable of acting far more quickly than Congress, which would hardly
finish the hearings stage in its legislative process before a protective state
takeover statute was enacted or the bid inspiring its action was
completed.
National mood is another important variable in policy agenda forma-
tion,69 and the public, while largely ignorant of the economic effects of
takeovers, has an unfavorable opinion of takeovers. 0 For example, the
public consistently adopts the following negative, yet uninformed, opin-
ions: (1) that workers are the losers, and executives and the acquiring
firm's shareholders are the winners, in takeovers; and (2) that mergers
are bad for the economy. 1 There is, however, scant evidence to support
such beliefs. In fact, a massive literature on acquisitions points precisely
in the opposite direction: as noted earlier, the losers in takeovers tend to
be top and middle-level management, and not production workers;' in
addition, it is target and not acquiring firm shareholders who gain from
65. See iL at 472-73.
66. See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 131 (1984).
67. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 224-25.
68. The tax code was amended to increase acquisition costs by imposing penalty taxes
on greenmail payments and certain golden parachutes, see Romano, supra note 23, at
174, restricting the use of net operating losses and repealing the distribution of appreci-
ated property without payment of the corporate level tax. Most of the provisions did not
have a significant impact on acquisitive activity because companies could simply comply
with the permitted parachute payment or gross-up management's pay to cover the tax,
and net operating losses and the step-up in asset basis are not important factors in
acquisitions.
69. See Kingdon, supra note 66, at 153.
70. See Romano, supra note 30, at 490-502.
71. See id. at 492, 495-96.
72. See Romano, supra note 23, at 129-31, 141-42.
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takeovers.73
Social psychologists' finding that subjective availability affects judg-
ments of causality suggests an explanation for the peculiar persistence of
the public's inaccurate impressions: in judging relative frequencies of
events, people tend to be influenced by the accessibility of the event in
their cognitive processes, even though there is no correlation between the
event's accessibility and its objective probability.7 4 For example, an indi-
vidual will vividly remember a news story on a takeover that resulted in
unemployed workers and use this event as evidence of the negative effects
of acquisitions, while numerous accounts of acquisitions with no job
losses do not disconfirm the initial account because the subsequent
stories are not dramatic enough to register with the observer.
The combination of a poorly informed public and of management's
organizational advantages in lobbying creates little political incentive for
national legislators to act differently from state legislators when it comes
to regulatory proposals on takeovers. As a consequence, national legisla-
tion will not be more hospitable to the market for corporate control than
state legislation. A leading publication for institutional investors,
reached the same conclusion in an editorial responding to the enactment
of the 1990 Pennsylvania takeover statute. Pensions and Investment Age
wrote: "Some leaders in the investment community suggest looking to
Congress to head off the states. But federal representatives succumb to
the same temptations as state legislators.""
CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKEOVER REGULATION
The recent history of state takeover laws does not weaken the case for
state competition but is an example of the merits of state competition.
As illustrated by the Pennsylvania experience, the federal system pro-
vides a safety valve against harmful laws. Some jurisdictions will have no
or only mild takeover regulation and this constrains how far other juris-
dictions can go, as well as how far management can go, in taking advan-
tage of value-decreasing regimes, especially when the less harsh laws are
in major corporate law states such as Delaware and California.
Can we do better? Scholarly research suggests that some state take-
over laws are more harmful than others. For example, as noted earlier,
unlike other forms of takeover regulation, control share acquisition stat-
utes and business freeze combination statutes have significant negative
stock price effects. The optimal policy would be to repeal such legisla-
tion. But repeal is improbable given present political realities. The sec-
ond best policy is to adopt a politically more palatable reform that makes
it easier for firms to opt out of a takeover statute. This would provide
73. See id. at 122-24.
74. See Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings
of Social Judgment 18-19, 21-22 (1980).
75. Demand Liberty, or Sell, Pensions and Investment Age, Apr. 30, 1990, at 16.
[Vol. 6
HeinOnline -- 61 Fordham L. Rev. 862 1992-1993
COMPETITION FOR CHAR TERS
shareholders with a more meaningful choice concerning takeover regula-
tion. In particular, the statutory defaults should be changed from opt-
out to opt-in regimes, as is the practice followed by Georgia.
The conventional approach to statutory default provisions is to choose
what the majority of firms would adopt if they had to specify a provision
in their charter. This approach avoids the transaction costs of holding a
shareholder vote when approval would be pro forma. The negative stock
price effects of takeover statutes suggest, however, that shareholders
would not prefer to be covered by such statutes. Indeed, because firms
could voluntarily adopt through charter amendments most restrictions
imposed by takeover statutes without authorizing legislation, the clear
implication of management's lobbying is that they believe that it is easier
to convince a state legislature of a takeover provision's desirability than
their shareholders. Reforming the statutory defaults to require share-
holder approval at least guarantees that the decision to reduce stock
prices by regulating takeovers is put into the hands of those who bear the
financial consequence.
Because management has an advantage over shareholders in using the
proxy mechanism, the difference between opting out and opting in may
have an important effect on outcomes. Firms pay for management's
proxy expenses as incurred, whereas firms reimburse outsiders' expenses
only when the outsiders are successful in gaining control and are thus in
a position to propose reimbursing themselves. Moreover, management is
unlikely to propose that the corporation defray the expenses of its oppo-
sition. Thus, because an investor's pro rata benefit is unlikely to cover
solicitation costs, an investor is unlikely to propose a charter amendment
(including one to opt out of a takeover statute). In addition, sharehold-
ers that are willing to bear solicitation costs will still be subject to a fur-
ther difficulty: in many states, management must initiate charter
amendments. This problem underscores what should be viewed as the
minimally acceptable reform regarding takeover statutes: statutory rules
for charter amendments ought to be changed to permit shareholder initi-
ation of proposals, at least in specific areas where there is a conflict of
interest between managers and shareholders.
Can we do worse than the current regulatory regime? Shifting juris-
diction from the states to the national government would be the
proverbial cure that is worse than the disease. Federal regulation is not a
solution to concerns over state intervention in the market for corporate
control because the restraint that federalism exerts on the form of take-
over statutes is not present in a national regime. At the national level,
there is no alternative incorporation site offering a less restrictive take-
over regime to which investors can shift their funds. Without alternative
sites, it is not possible to set a floor on how low a legislature that is
captured by management can go. In addition, the diversity of state laws
in unsettled or controversial subjects such as takeovers produces a con-
tinuing flow of information concerning the actual effects of different pol-
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icy choices that would be extinguished under any uniform national
approach. Finally, members of Congress experience the same pressure as
members of state legislatures to tilt the regulatory apparatus toward
management, and while the downside of the state system will remain in
the national arena, federalism's upside protection against poor policy
choices will be absent.
These considerations counsel against championing national interven-
tion. Expecting national legislation to reverse state restrictions on take-
overs is, at best, wishful thinking and could well be counter productive
because it will, in all probability, produce even more damaging legisla-
tion with none of the safety valves present in a federal system. Instead,
we should explore removing the current national restrictions. The most
politically feasible way to do this is through small-scale experimentation
that is designed to discover the optimal regime by enabling firms to opt
out of the Williams Act, or parts thereof, upon a shareholder vote. The
desirability of enabling codes at the state level should be duplicated in the
national regime. But a more important undertaking at this time is to
educate the public about how the market for corporate control works for
their benefit.76 For without popular support, Congress and state legisla-
tures will be unlikely to cross the organized and politically well-con-
nected opponents of hostile takeovers.
76. See Romano, supra note 30, at 504. In criticizing my thesis, Morey McDaniel
asserts that the public is concerned about the losers from takeovers, not the winners. See
Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 121, 154 n. 120
(1991). This contention entirely misses my point that there is a vast amount of misinfor-
mation concerning workers as the alleged victims of hostile takeovers being peddled to
the public by corporate managers. Although there is considerable evidence that top man-
agers-who are the principal publicists concerning the evils of hostile takeovers-often
do lose their jobs, there is no systematic evidence that workers are harmed by takeovers.
See Romano, supra note 23, at 129-31, 141-42.
[Vol. 61
HeinOnline -- 61 Fordham L. Rev. 864 1992-1993
